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Roundtable Discussion
PROFESSOR KMIEC: I would like to begin by pursuing some of the
insight Professor Sullivan brought to light in the area of free speech. Professor
Sullivan, you drew our attention to the distinction between people who are
speaking on their own dime and people who are relying upon the public dime.
These government speech decisions, including United States v. American
Library Ass'n t and Rust v. Sullivan,2 were cases that the late Chief Justice
Rehniquist seemed to advance.
I think I also heard you say that in Morse v. Frederick you gave some
advice to the Dean about maybe relying on a version of this government speech
theory. I, too, thought that a very wise way to pursue the Morse record without
getting into content distinctions. In essence, the argument would say, "Well,
this really is the school's program, and a school platform, and the student is
wrongfully commandeering that." That approach did not seem to have complete
resonance in the Morse case, at least not at the level I would have thought.
Perhaps it was because the Dean argued the case differently. He argued it on the
basis of the illegal message.
Nevertheless, do you think that one of the signals in Morse is that Justice
Alito does not share the same supposition that speech can be limited when it is
on the government's dime?
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: That is a very good question. Again, I think
Justice Alito might find that speech is protected even in certain circumstances
where it is a student speaking in a public school, where it is a government
employee speaking out against an employer, or a recipient of government funds,
but I think it is the content of the speech that will matter more to Justice Alito.
Some speech will be more protected than other speech in those settings, and
in his view, there was no reason to protect the "bong hits" fellow against
suppression by a totalitarian state, whereas there might be if the student
speaking in school was trying to express a minority point of view within that
school system. I think content may matter.
1. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
2. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
3. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
Similarly, with respect to the campaign finance case, the fact that it was
core political speech mattered a lot to the majority.4 Chief Justice Roberts
echoed Justices Kennedy's, Thomas's, and Scalia's prior opinions on campaign
finance.5 If this is the core of political of speech, and if we are going to protect
plastic bag burning, topless dancing, and smut on cable television-if we are
going to protect all these things that are really ancillary to the First
Amendment-we should certainly protect core things.
Justice Stevens in his Morse dissent said you should protect the speaker's
right to decide whether the speech is protected.6 It should be up to the speaker.
He also said it was an uncommonly silly speech, and that we had all been
snookered into thinking that Mr. Frederick was saying anything intelligible at all
when he said "Bong Hits 4 Jesus."7 However, I can faithfully report that the
Sullivan/Kmiec position got zero votes.
My specific advice was to treat it like it was an outdoor assembly or a
pageant. I was nervous about saying drug speech is categorically unprotected,
because you would want a student to be able to say in civics class, "Well, I think
medicinal marijuana should be an exception to the drug laws." You wouldn't
want to plant the seed that this type of speech would be considered unprotected
drug speech.
But it is a different thing to wear "Go Medical Marijuana" on your jersey in
a football game, because that is the school speaking, and the student has become
a billboard for the school. I thought the situation in Morse was more like
wearing a T-shirt to a football game than speaking about medicinal marijuana in
civics class. I thought that was the distinction to draw, but the Court went more
with the pro-drug message.
I do not mean to go on too long. I just think that there is strong support for
freedom of speech, especially if it is political and especially if it is perceived as
a dissent against a majority.
MS. BISKUPIC: I actually have the dissent with me, parts of it, because I
wanted to look into distinctions by which they separate themselves from the
other more conservative jurists. I know most us do not like the term
"conservative," but as journalists, we lapse into it frequently.
Justice Alito said was that he wanted to make sure that he was joining the
opinion in Morse with the understanding that "it goes no further than to hold that
speech ... that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug
4. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
5. Id.
6. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643-49 (Stephens, J., dissenting) ("The notion that the message on this
banner would actually persuade either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or
her behavior is most implausible. That the Court believes such a silly message can be proscribed as
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use" is not protected.8 He wanted to ensure that he was saying nothing about
speech on political, social issues, such as the broader wisdom of the war on
drugs. If you had gone further with your anti-drug thread in the needle, as
Professor Sullivan said, it probably would not have gotten Justice Alito.
DEAN STARR: It is a very pro-free-speech Court. Free speech does not
always win, but the advocate is well advised in fashioning her or his positions
with the mindset that the baseline for this Court is free speech is good-more
protective than our past Courts.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Although with respect, I think, Garcetti cuts a bit
against that thought.9 In terms of seeing free speech as good, Garcetti is a case
that seems to make little sense in terms of the kinds of incentives one might
think the Court would want to encourage-namely, having an employee freely
bring out concerns about public mistake within, rather than outside, a public
organization.
PROFESSOR AMAR: Chief Justice Roberts went out of his way at the
beginning of Rumsfeld v. FAIR to say that the Court was not going to decide that
case with respect to whether the funding condition gave them more power or
not; the Court was not going to ask whether the federal government could
require universities that do not receive federal funding to open their doors to a
military recruiter. 10 But, the answer to that is yes.
I am not sure the Morse Court would have allowed punishing the same
message on a student's laptop computer at home that happened to find its way
back to campus the next day through a few friends who were snickering about it.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: I am just curious, Dean Starr, were you concerned
that the Court might interpret the message, as Justice Stevens did, to actually be
protesting the war on drugs? He cited his Vietnam experience and prohibition in
the 1920s. "
DEAN STARR: It is very hard to say this may not have had political
resonance, especially in Alaska where there is an active political debate about
8. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
9. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
10. See generally Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
I1. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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legalization. 12 On behalf of the Juneau School Board, we were very concerned
about exactly how to treat the speech happily. We plumbed the record and
found statements by the young man himself, but they really did not help his
case. He simply said he was just trying to get attention, 3 and there was no real
substance to his message. Was it a religious message? No. It emphatically was
not a religious message. Was it a political message? No, it wasn't. That was
what seemed to be our safe point, but that did not convince four Justices. 14
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Here are a couple of questions from our audience,
both here and at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia. They relate to
the freedom of association-in particular, that of the Boy Scouts.1 5 How can
they have a right of association, it is asked, but then be penalized for exercising
that right, when they are told in several places that they cannot have the
preferred pier or the preferred public camping space because of their
associational choice? Where is the limit on conditioning a constitutional right,
whether it be the right of free speech or, in the Scout's case, the right of
association?
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I think the conditions are more suspect the
more coercive they are, and I think the Solomon Amendment is as coercive as
the condition could possibly be. 16 "We will take away all of your biomedical
research funding. We will take all of your English as a second language
funding. We will take away all of your sports funding. We will take away all of
your funding if your renegade law school will not let the JAG Corps on
campus." Well, that is a very coercive condition. Everybody has to capitulate
to that. There is no question.
The condition is less coercive where the Boy Scouts have many other
opportunities to go elsewhere in the community. I think the result really
depends on whether there are private substitutes. It depends on the potential
spectrum of alternative opportunities.
Let me just reference Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Webster case, where
the Court upheld a Missouri law prohibiting public financing of hospitals that
perform abortions. He said the Court this to be an interference with the right
of privacy, because it is not coercive where you have private alternatives to the
12. See, e.g., Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that, in Alaska,
"referenda regarding marijuana legalization repeatedly occur and a controversial state court decision
on the topic had recently issued.").
13. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (noting the banner was "designed to attract attention from television cameras.").
14. Id.; see also id. at 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.) ("[A] full
and frank discussion of the costs and benefits of the attempt to prohibit the use of marijuana is far
wiser than suppression of speech because it is unpopular.").
15. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
16. 10 U.S.C. 983 (1996).
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state hospital. 17 If we had a national health service, on the other hand, he said
that the result might be different. 18
I think denial of public funding could be the equivalent of a regulation, but
I tend to think it depends on the alternatives. Pamphlets seem to be the vehicle
of the small voice, the poorly financed class of people. The poorer and less well
funded you are, and the more of a chokehold the state has on speech, then the
more reason there is to worry about the conditions I think.
I do not know the facts of the case you referred to well enough to say, but
the Boy Scouts have many alternatives. Similarly, if the woman seeking
abortion has lots of alternatives, then the denial of public opportunities has not
become urgent.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: To what degree are the new members-Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito-signing on to the idea of substantive due
process, out of which the punitive damage limitation was created?
DEAN STARR: Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have signed
on to the use of substantive due process. Although, Justice Breyer was skillfully
elusive in Philip Morris v. Williams, suggesting that this action was entirely a
procedural mechanism-namely, that the jury could consider harm to others
when determining reprehensibility.' 9 This is one of the factors that goes into
determining whether punitive damages will lie, and if so, the amount of punitive
damages. One can use this factor in the reprehensibility analysis, but one cannot
consider that harm to others in actually calculating the amount.
Now, this is where we could have lots of fun with the procedural versus
substantive distinction. There is a little bit of cover, but there is no reason to
believe, based upon their other jurisprudence, that they are concerned with the
use of substantive due process. They are concerned with your restrained issues,
but less so with the idea that the Due Process Clause is going to have substantive
content.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Restrained substantive due process?
DEAN STARR: Yes.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Is Justice Alito going to be concerned?
17. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
18. Id.
19. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063-64 (2007).
DEAN STARR: The right to play tennis may not come in, but when you
look at the history and traditions of the people, there is a more restrained push of
substantive due process, as opposed to a wide-open, robust vision of individual
autonomy.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Has living in Malibu changed your view on the
right to play tennis?
DEAN STARR: I am not sure the Constitution speaks that implicitly to it.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Won't some people say that the line drawing under
so-called substantive due process is only a political one?
DEAN STARR: One might say that. In fairness, if you read Justice
Breyer's opinion, he is looking to the great traditions of the common law,
specifically, control of what he calls the arbitrary exercise of power.2 °
Punishment should be proportional. This is a Breyer principle drawn from the
common law.
PROFESSOR AMAR: Where are Justices Scalia and Thomas on this
substantive due process question?
DEAN STARR: They will have none of it. Now, Exxon Valdez is on its
way up to the Court.21 We will see whether the Justices take the case.22 There,
it is no longer the federal Constitution controlling state juries, it is federal
maritime law. And so as Walter Dellinger of O'Melveny & Myers puts it, it is
time for Justices Scalia and Thomas to come play.23
MS. BISKUPIC: You know, your question of how to break down the usual
alliances on punitive damages reminds me also of how much this Court has
changed on the question since the early 1990s.
Remember the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip case? 24 That
was actually the very first time that Justice O'Connor dissented from the bench.
She had never done it in her almost ten years on the Court at that point.
Interestingly, that first oral dissent came on a punitive damages case. Having
her business interest from Arizona, she was looking for the Court to take that
20. Id.
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (No. 07-219), 2007 WL
2383784.
22. Subsequent to this presentation, the Court did, in fact, grant certiorari. See Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 492 (Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219) (granting petition for certiorari).
23. Walter Dellinger led the appeal and made the oral argument on behalf of Exxon Shipping
Company on February 27, 2008. Transcript of Oral Argument, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (No.
07-219), 2008 WL 534746.
24. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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turn away from jury latitude on punitive damages. Of course, the Court did take
a greater turn in that area after she left.
DEAN STARR: Let us turn to the next brief topic we would like to take up
with you. It is one that our friend Jeffrey Rosen has explored at some length.
At the beginning of his service, the Chief Justice indicated that he wanted the
Court to speak with one voice. 25  He wanted the Court to speak as an
institution.26 He wanted it to be more than just a series of academics in a room
propagating theories. The question is whether he can achieve that in some
manner, given the practices of the modem Court.
It seems to me there are a number of things that influence the possibility of
unanimity: collegiality and temperament; opinion assignment practices and the
strategy of opinion assignment, in terms of when you give an opinion to Justice
Kennedy and when you do not; and the ability to talk things out in conference
before you set your ideas down and write them.
One of the things we know about Chief Justice Rehnquist was that he kept
those trains running on time. But one of the consequences of trains running on
time is that things went down into writing quickly. The conversations and the
conference were short, and people's positions got locked in by virtue of that.
So those are some thoughts about the meager abilities that the Chief has in
his disposition. He has his smile, and he has his charm, which is great. He has a
little bit of opinion assignment authority. What else?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Well, that is it. I mean, when I talked to him, he
said, "The assignment power is not my greatest power, it is my only power." He
talked about how most of his predecessors have been failures. He was about to
spend the summer reading biographies of Chief Justices. He said he wanted to
resurrect Marshall's vision for the Court, not because he was comparing himself
to Marshall, he said, but because Marshall was his greatest predecessor.
The questions I would love to resolve on this panel, because they are of
great interest to me are: why did he say that, why did he fail, and what do you
see in the future? I will briefly set forth my tentative thoughts on these issues.
First, will he succeed? Systems do not run well. His colleagues have been
polled on this question, and each of them has been discouraged. When asked
what Roberts would see in the future, Justice Scalia smiled sweetly and said,
"Goodbye." He was not very encouraging. I asked Justice Breyer this question
four different ways this summer in an interview, and he dodged it very
eloquently. He said the other Justices could join his opinions. Justice Kennedy
25. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2007), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200701/j ohn-roberts.
26. Id.
said they could assign him more opinions. Finally, when Justice Stevens was
recently asked if Chief Justice Roberts would succeed, he said, "I don't think so.
We were all being nice to him during the first Tenn. It was the honeymoon."
Justice Alito was had just taken the bench, so he did not want to do anything too
controversial, but it takes nine votes around here to do this. The idea that you
can charm people is overstated. Chief Justice Rehnquist was supposed to be
charming, but he was not. He was a nice guy, but he won because he had five
votes. It was silly to think that he could do much more than that.
My question then becomes why would Chief Justice Roberts have said this
and set himself up for failure? He must have known his colleagues disagreed.
In fact, when I asked him about his greatest opposition, he signaled-without
saying explicitly-Justice Kennedy. This is because Kennedy prefers it to be
the "Kennedy Court."
Frankly, maybe the Chief Justice was a little bit overconfident. It was the
beginning, and his first Term had gone really well. He had acheived a string of
unanimous opinions. He never had a big failure, and he was fairly successful in
actually bringing people over to his side while on the D.C. Circuit.
The crucial thing he did not say in the interview, and which I did not
anticipate, is that when he talked about narrowing everyone's opinions, he was
not talking about compromise. He did not mean he was going to split the
difference. He was confident enough to think he could convince the others to
come over to his side. In that sense, he was overconfident. He was wrong.
DEAN STARR: Now, there is a sense, though, in which we can say he
achieved some level of success, not just in that first Term where he had the
benefit of the honeymoon, but last Term where Justice Kennedy was largely on
the side of Chief Justice Roberts in all of these five-to-four opinions.
27
PROFESSOR KMIEC: There was an interesting academic study that found
Justice Kennedy to have stayed remarkably consistent-at least up to the early
1990s. 28 He has changed and evolved less than almost any other Justice. And
27. Of the twenty-four five-to-four decisions in OT 2006, Justice Kennedy voted with the
majority every time, and Chief Justice Roberts was in the majority sixteen times. See Ben
Winograd, Visual Representation of 5-4 Decisions, (June 28, 2007) available at http://www.
scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Final5-4visual.pdf.
28. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483, 1505-06 (2007).
Turning from the recent past to the immediate present, the article also shines valuable
light on Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. He is commonly depicted as having stepped into
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's role as the "swing" Justice. But Epstein and her co-
authors demonstrate that in fact, Kennedy has changed very little since 1990 in any
doctrinal area, and that on the subject of affirmative action, still a volatile issue for the
Court, he has never shown evidence of shifting from his view that government policy
should simply not take race into account for any reason. The article thus offers a valuable
corrective to sloppy thinking and writing about the current Court.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Who Change: A Response to Epstein Et Al., 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1885,
1885-86 (2007), referencing Lee Epstein et al., supra.
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the views he expressed last Term were consistent with the ones he has been
expressing all along.
Perhaps, the case for Chief Justice Roberts winning over Justice Kennedy is
evident in the business cases. There were eighteen business cases; fourteen
were unanimous, and the other three of them did not divide along the usual five-
to-four division.
MS. BISKUPIC: I do not think you can count the times when Justice
Kennedy was with the Chief Justice as a victory for Chief Justice Roberts. I do
think he set up a false expectation for everybody, especially himself. But I think
what it also did was to push the left closer together.
During this recent Term, the four Justices on the left banded together in a
way that they had not done in several years. I think the Chief Justice caused a
more polarized situation. If you look at the Hein case, you might have seen a
little bit more consensus or cohesion among the Justices' opinion, but it was at
the end of the Term. 29 At that point, I think both camps had started to dig in,
and I do not think anyone was looking for consensus at that point.
I think this might be a blip on the whole screen, frankly, because it came
right after this unusual first Term where there was some unanimity. Chief
Justice Roberts drew a bit of a line in the sand that caused the liberals to back
away, but I think this might still be short-lived. Everybody might calm down a
bit more after this Term. But again, I would not count what Justice Kennedy did
to be something that was the result of Chief Justice Roberts.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Chief Justice Roberts said he was going to try to
achieve unanimity in the less contentious, statutory cases, and that if he
succeeded there, the Justices might be predisposed to look for common ground
in the larger constitutional matters. Does anyone wish to comment?
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: There has always been unanimity in many areas
of statutory law that only a lawyer could love. In fact, you underestimate how
many cases every Term come down unanimously. But I think the idea of using
this as a springboard to unanimity could not have been more wrong. Last Term,
the Court was as polarized as it has ever been, not only with respect to the
number of five-to-four decisions, but also with respect to the depth of the
division and the passion with which dissents were announced from the bench.
MS. BISKUPIC: The question is: why did the liberals get so angry?
Because they knew what he was like. Well there was something that happened
early on that I think got their backs up a bit. It might have been some of the
29. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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early votes in conference. We do not hear these votes when they occur. We
only see the rulings in the spring. The Justices have voted on them in the fall, so
they would have already known the divisions and anger behind the scenes. I
wonder if some of that was revealing itself in ways we did not know at the time.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Part of it might also be the treatment of precedent.
Is it better to overturn openly, better to be candid?
PROFESSOR AMAR: The honeymoon Term was also a relatively
unimportant Term where there were not many contentious cases. There
certainly was not a case that was nearly as big as Gonzalez v. Carhart.30 There
was no case dealing with resident-based affirmative action. This is a very smart
Court, and these are nine very competent people. I think it is particularly hard to
win people over when they have not just thought things through, but they are
also pretty confident in their own abilities. I am not actually sure whether
unanimity or consensus-an opinion of five-is always better.
DEAN STARR: There is one reason for dissenters to feel so strongly, and
that is precisely because they are dissenters. The current dissenters were not
losing a lot of cases two Terms ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist's last Term. Justice
Stevens was triumphant. This Term, other than a bad penalty in Massachusetts
v. EPA,31 Chief Justice Roberts won on case after case after case.
So wouldn't he love unanimity? Of course he would. But he is a litigator.
He wants to win, and he has done an extremely successful job thus far.
On another note, how can there be unanimity when Justice Thomas keeps
disagreeing with the Chief Justice and Justice Alito? They vote the same way,
but they have a profoundly different jurisprudential provision.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I have to agree with that. I think one of the
most interesting things about last Term was the fragmentations within the so-
called "conservative five." Justice Scalia was often more critical of Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion than even the dissenters, because he thinks to overrule
without saying you are overruling may have many explanations. It may be a
political ploy; it deafens the Court, creating an issue for the left to use politics.
This type of ruling is certainly not going to win friends and influence
among people who are idealists, like Scalia and Thomas, who would never want
to sign on to an opinion that not true to their principles.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Jeffrey Rosen wrote in an article that someone who
is highly ideological tends to be marginalized on the Court.32 Isn't John Roberts
30. 127 S. Ct. 1610(2007).
31. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
32. Rosen, supra note 25 ("The ideological purists are marginalized on the Court, while those
who understand when not to take each principle to its logical extreme are vindicated by history.").
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less of an ideological person in the sense that he has these inclinations to build
this consensus? He has not, by and large, undertaken to do what Chief Justice
Rehnquist did, say, in Dickerson33-namely, swallowing his longstanding
opposition to Miranda,34 and basically taking that opinion up on his own.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Exactly. So my question is whether he is more
likely to do this in the future? Is he more likely to compromise because he does
not want to preside with the most conflicted Court in history?
I will put it this way-am I just the victim of foolish optimism if I say that
having committed himself to this vision, and obviously having the impulses, he
would be embarrassed to fail? This man has never failed at anything he has
done. He is incredibly successful. He would not want to fail by the standards he
set up for himself, and therefore might we tentatively hope that he will be
compromising in the future?
MS. BISKUPIC: The Court is about to change, though. We have the
election coming up in 2009. Now, of course, Chief Justice Roberts is working
with the people that he has. But this is going to change. In 2009, one way or
another, the Court is probably going to change. And if a Democrat wins the
presidential election, we predict that Justices Stevens and Souter would possibly
leave. Maybe more liberal people would come on, and Roberts would start
losing more of the votes.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: It would still be five-to-four liberal.
MS. BISKUPIC: But the dynamics of the Court are nonetheless going to
change.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: If a Democrat wins, and there are some younger
liberals on the Court, would Roberts then compromisc because he would not
want to preside over the five-to-four Court? Does anyone think he will?
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: He has never really made one liberal vote
except deciding you should get remedies if the Post Office misdelivers your
mail."5
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33. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
34. Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. See Dolan v. United States Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481 (2006) (holding that a claim for
negligent placement of mail under the Federal Tort Claims Act was not barred by statute).
PROFESSOR AMAR: Exactly. Two good cases to consider in that respect
are Morse v. Frederick36 and Parents Involved.37 Justices Kennedy and Alito,
writing separately in Morse, are eminently defensible. It is hard for me to
believe that anyone really wants to count this kind of punishment against
students for pure political speech, even involving drugs. So why didn't the
Chief Justice adopt that position if he wanted to get more consensus? He also
could have written a very narrow opinion in Parents Involved that would have
kept Kennedy on board simply saying that the plan fell on the Gratz side of the
Grutter line. He chose not to do those two things.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: This may seem trivial in comparison to these
insights, but research has shown that one of the things responsible for fractured
opinions is the happenstance of typography. At one point some years ago,
people started to put roman numerals in opinions and divided them because they
were getting too long to read, and they took up outlining as a practice. But once
they were outlined, they invited people to say, "Well, I agree with Part I.C, but
not I.A or I.B." Is there something that the Chief Justice should do as
administrator of the Court that says, "I hereby abolish roman numerals"?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Good luck.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: John Marshall was able to do it.
DEAN STARR: Gimmicks are not going to work. There is a clash of
visions and a clash of moral views at work. Welcome to judicial democracy.
Not everyone is going to line up and say, "Let's all sign this wonderful opinion
on abortion. Oh, what does it hold?"
PROFESSOR AMAR: You draw extensions in footnotes instead-all one
section with a few more footnotes.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Three cheers for division. Let me just contest
the premise. Normatively, you might say that seriatim, the British method, is
bad because it makes every judge or justice into his own person. But there is
nothing wrong with pointed division. We have an odd number of Justices. That
is our tradition, and as part of that tradition, unequal votes can be preserved.
There is nothing terribly damaging for a robust constitutional democracy to have
pointed division on the Court. We had it in the period of the Espionage Act.
We had it in the period of the New Deal cases.
36. Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.
37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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PROFESSOR KMIEC: Let's focus then on the effect of lack of consensus
on public acceptance of the law. When an opinion is five-to-four does it have
the same level of respect and dignity that a nine-to-zero opinion or seven-to-two
opinion has?
MS. BISKUPIC: I think the public is bitterly divided on some of these
issues.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: The questions on which the Justices are divided are
generally the same ones on which the public is divided.
Affirmative action certainly has an amount of razor edge, and there are
backlashes in both directions as responses in Texas and California show. There
are also backlashes with abortion, but probably less so. The Court has its finger
on the pulses in the center by protecting early choice, but also by allowing
restrictions on later-term choice.
In situations where the Roberts Court comes down heavily on one side of a
contentious question, such as Seattle Schools, history suggests there might be
backlashes. In the case for unanimity-at least the liberal strategic case for
unanimity-it would have been better for the Court to have done what Professor
Amar suggested, simply saying that Gratz rather than Grutter strict scrutiny
applied, instead of going for broke and trying to strike down all race
consciousness.
I also could have imagined a way of threading a needle on the partial
birth case. In each of those cases, there was a narrower alternative available,
although maybe not unanimous-I suppose Justice Stevens would have
dissented in any event.
Turning back to the broader picture, I think that Chief Justice Roberts'
stemmed in large part from desire to establish stronger precedent. He said to
me, "I have to convince the other Justices that rather than flipping a coin and
maybe winning 50 percent of the time in five-to-four decision, it is more
interesting to win 100 percent of the time on a more narrow issue, because it is
harder to overturn that decision."
PROFESSOR KMIEC: If unanimity or consensus is elusive on particularly
sensitive or difficult issues, I am going to transition now by asking if there still
might be some consensus achieved, even with very different judicial
personalities, by focusing on method of interpretation.
In terms of resolving Parents Involved, for example, we have illustrated
here that original understanding was not the consensus, unless original
understanding included precedent. Let me set this up by making a few remarks
about the competing methods of interpretation, and then you can each tell me
where a particular Justice fits, if at all, in this scheme of things.
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First, interpretation always relates to a text. Out of that text comes another
text, the linguistic rephrasing of the first text. There is the text of the
Constitution and out of that is derived the opinion-based interpretation of it.
What connects the first text to the second is a method of interpretation. As a
result, it can be argued that method ultimately is what determines whether
meaning is accurately discerned or not. If that's the case, what are the
competing methods? I am assuming, by the way, that we have judges of
good faith, so that we might think of the formula for the rule of law as: legal
text, plus the method of interpretation, plus good faith judicial work, equals
legal meaning.
Now, on one side of the ledger is textualism and originalism. On the other
side of the ledger is nontextualism and nonoriginalism. What are some of the
competing things that are said about these methods of interpretation?
First, textualism stands for the proposition that words can be used with such
precision and clarity that the meaning leaps from the page. Take, for example,
the word "year" in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution. 38 The President
shall serve for a term of four years. I think most people in this room would say,
in terms of textualism, that has a definite meaning. It jumps off the page. We
know what "year" means. In point of fact, however, we could introduce
ambiguity even to that word.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Leap year.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Exactly. Even with textualism you can, in fact,
introduce ambiguities, and because that is so, it belies its own premise.
PROFESSOR AMAR: Well, what does equal protection mean, especially
when the Fifteenth Amendment uses the word "race"?
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Yes, that is the textualism problem. So the focus
then turns to originalism. One originalist conception finds meaning in the intent
of the drafters. Frankly, finding that specific intent is said to be either too hard
to find or illegitimate, because it prefers the drafter over the enacting assembly.
Original understanding is an alternative version of originalism that looks to the
literary usage at the time a provision was enacted.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Isn't that the ratifying meaning?
PROFESSOR KMIEC: It could be the ratifying meaning, but it might mean
more than just the understanding of the ratifiers. Justice Scalia broadens it
beyond the drafters and the ratifiers, to encompass the understanding in
existence at large in the community at the time the measure becomes law.
38. U.S. CONST. Art. 22 § I.
C.CA
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PROFESSOR ROSEN: I do not mean to press it, but you are requiring us to
focus on the concept of originalism in the Brown case. 39 This is the central
testing for any theory of interpretation. And the fact that there is not a word of
this type of reasoning in Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Parents
Involved, makes it hard for people who want to believe in their good faith and
think that they are really a conscientious originalist.
40
PROFESSOR KMIEC: So originalism, too, runs into rough ground. But
what is the opposing side? The opposing side is the negative critique that
basically says you really cannot even know the conventional meaning of words
at the time of enactment, or even if you can know it, you ought not be limited to
it, and hence, one gets some version of the "living constitution."
PROFESSOR AMAR: It is interesting. The "living constitution" is one of
those law professor conceits that, as flawed as originalism in the Scalia fashion
may be, many Justices on the Court say "I do not care about text structure and
original intent of drafters or ratifiers. I am going to go my own way." They
play games at a level of generality, and conservatives sometimes avoid the
question in the race cases, but there is not this kind of liberal rejectionism, in
part, because it has a broad appeal. If you told the American public, "We're not
going to be bound by the text or original understanding of the generation that
created those words," I think that would be a tough sell.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Indeed, even original understanding might well be a
tough sell over original intent to the public at large. The search for specific
intent is so deep in our culture that it goes back to Aristotle's Ethics.41 Aristotle
basically says if you have an ambiguity in a statute, you should put yourself in
the place of the original drafter and ask what he would have done at the time of
the drafting. So it has a long legacy, but as noted above, it is not followed.
The question becomes: is there a competing theory with original
understanding that has any legitimacy? The versions of the "living constitution"
are all over the place, and certainly, there is no general public consensus
supporting any particular one as far as I can discern.
Originalists will say any version of non-originalism merely transfers to the
judges that which otherwise should be in the democratic process. That is the
standard counterpoint. The "living constitution" alternative is always some
introduction of someone's value-set. Both conservatives and liberals do this.
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746-68.
41. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1796
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
On the liberal side, for example, Justice Stephen Breyer's doctrine of active
liberty 42 is a value-based theory of participatory democracy. On the
conservative side, some would say the whole Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence is built on the value of our Federalism standing behind-and
significantly changing-the text of that Amendment. Richard Posner's "law and
economics" is another nominally conservative value, though one not often seen
at the Supreme Court level, which measures outcomes in terms of the results
they produce. Of course, this is met by the objection that the idea of measuring
utility subverts law insofar as the idea of legal rights is that they are enforced,
notwithstanding the consequences that they may produce.
So do any of these scholarly theories find their way into the jurisprudence
of individual Justices?
DEAN STARR: Yes, especially originalism. This is the reason I wanted to
talk about Justice Thomas, but first I will say just a couple of words about this
very interesting overview. It seems to me that what you actually see in practice
is a hybrid drawing from these different traditions you have articulated. There is
not, however, a monolithic devotion to one and an exclusion of the others,
except perhaps by Justice Thomas.
Drawing from history and tradition, Earl Warren was a great historian and
traditionalist. Read Powell v. McCormack.43 It seems to me that this Court does
not have the unifying moral vision that the Warren Court had. This was a moral
vision which, at this very high level of generality, embodied the better society,
the more equal society, and the Supreme Court idea of progress.
The Rehnquist Court fell in love with federalism and some structural
principles and the like, but then seemed to sort of fall out of love. The one
person who I had described as the most original Justice I would now say is the
most iconoclastic Justice. 4 I wanted to use a very specific example in this last
Term, and that is Justice Thomas.
An arena that should warm the cockles of all those who believe that we live
in a country and not a confederation is the dormant Commerce Clause-judicial
power being brought to bear with respect to state actions that discriminate
against interstate commerce. It is as old as the republic itself. It is called
protectionism or parochialism.
In 1994, Justice Thomas said in United Haulers that he had joined an
opinion that gave life to the dormant Commerce Clause, but he foreswore that he
was wrong-that the entire enterprise since 1824 has been wrong.45 Justice
Thomas is so dedicated to the proposition that we must get it right, no matter
42. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005).
43. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
44. See KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE
(2003).
45. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1799
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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how much china in the judicial shop gets broken, that he is even willing with
regard to statutory interpretation, to say, "I don't care that it's been a settled
interpretation of federal law for over a generation. I don't care. I have a duty to
get it right."
Now, what is it that is driving him? I think it is his vision of originalism.
But what happens when you come to the Fourth Amendment and the issue of
what is a reasonable search or seizure? Doesn't that call for a judgment? And
surely one wouldn't say, "Well, what did James Madison think about car
searches?"
PROFESSOR KMIEC: As Jefferson Powell argues, the Framers'
"originalism" may itself have anticipated that contemporary considerations
would be assessed. In other words, the "living constitution" was what was
originally intended.
MS. BISKUPIC: That is why Justice Thomas's view is going nowhere.
Even Justice Scalia's view, which is close, but not as narrow, has not found
fans within the Court. Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts will vote more
with Justice Scalia than their two predecessors did. In fact, that was the case last
year. But this does not mean they are buying into his view of originalism-they
are not. I think when you get to the core of your question about consensus and
what the Justices agree with, these judicial philosophies divide the Justices much
more. But they do not actually play out that much in the bottom-line rulings.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Dean Starr, Justice Alito even divided from Chief
Justice Roberts in United Haulers, as I remember.46
DEAN STARR: Yes, Justice Alito is much more Hamiltonian than Chief
Justice Roberts, who is still somewhat Rehnquist-like in having a warm spot in
his heart for the states.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: On the current Court, each Justice has a coherent
approach as rooted in temperament, as in any sort of abstract technology. The
differences among them are much more relevant than similarities. The Justices
are doing something quite different than academics.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: If the Justices are being guided not by any theory of
interpretation, but by, as you say, "temperament," isn't that merely what Ronald
Dworkin would call the external factors of judging-namely, psychology,
46. See id. at 1803-12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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personal experience, and background? 47 Professor Rosen, you nicely assess the
temperament and psychology in your splendid biographical sketches of the
Justices, but how does one build that into a rule of law?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Each is coherent in its own way. Justice Kennedy
is a good example of someone who completely resists all of the methodological
categories that you set out. You could not put him in any of those processes.
But he has a coherent vision, which some will find attractive, and others less so.
He is not an originalist in any way. He said he is quite interested in drafting
or ratifying history, not in being a pragmatist. Unlike Justice O'Connor, who
cared about consequences, who could split every difference, and who was
acutely sensitive to the impact of the decisions on society, Justice Kennedy is a
romantic idealist who prefers enforcing broad principles regardless of the
disruptive consequences.
How does he operate? Using his own words, he suggested that he tends to
make snap decisions; he has intuition about a particular case, and then he tries to
express it as a broad and sweeping ideal. He has a fondness for literary images
and archetypes, as well as judicial ones. He believes that the role of a judge,
like that of great authors, is to impose order on a disordered society, and then to
compare the law in question with his abstraction about how the world should be.
I have no doubt of his good faith and the fact that he is struggling earnestly to
get the right answers that he pleases. You can construct a vision about how that
approach is consistent with the judge's role to enforce the Constitution, the same
way that you can construct a democratic classification for Justice Breyer's
approach.
DEAN STARR: Don't you think that the root of this is a very robust vision
of liberty, including, but not limited to, freedom of conscience?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Absolutely. Liberty is at the center, as you know.
Justice Breyer has a couple of strong ideals that he believes in: liberty,
autonomy, and the idea that the state cannot be interfering in the visual
conscience. These are principles, and they are philosophical events. He
believes in them, and he is going to enforce them.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: But, if there is a disconnect between any consistent
method of interpretation and what they are actually doing, isn't that the ultimate
reason why Chief Justice Roberts' hope for consensus is going to be an
impossibility? Yet, isn't one of the services that we do, if we do a service as
legal scholars, to allow judicial decision-makers the opportunity to see their
work in the reflective mirror of a coherent theory?
47. For more information about Professor Dworkin and for links to many of his articles, see New
York University Department of Philosophy: Ronald Dworkin, New York University,
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/ronalddworkin.
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PROFESSOR AMAR: Well, I think Justice Breyer's book, Active Liberty,
is a self-conscious attempt to try to organize some of that. It was a response to
the idea that if the Justices are doing what Professor Rosen says we are doing,
then there is a problem with that.4 My critique of Active Liberty is that it
does not account for some major areas of law, such as those presented in
Stenberg and maybe Philip Morris. 49 Maybe for Philip Morris, you can say,
well, the book had to have some sense of proportionality. But Michael
McConnell wrote a review of Active Liberty saying that a book about deference
and decision-making should not fail to discuss what they did in these cases. 50
There is a gaping hole.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Scalia's book also had inconsistencies. 51
Regardless, Justices Breyer and Scalia needed to trade their principles, but at
least they had principles to trade.
PROFESSOR AMAR: They are just a little less rooted in something we
would call distinctively legal.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: To wrap up, let's take a brief look at this year's
docket. Is there any case that strikes you as particularly important and that you
want to make an observation about?
DEAN STARR: Because I am the business person on the panel, one case
that comes to mind is the Stoneridge case, dealing with Rule 10(b)(5). 52 During
the oral argument two weeks ago, Chief Justice Roberts, in talking about Rule
1Ob-5 and Section 10b, made a very interesting comment, and no one
contradicted him. To the counsel who was urging an expansion of Rule 10(b)(5)
liability going beyond the issuer to third parties who are doing business with the
issuer, he said that Rule 10(b)(5) is a private cause of action that we made up.
He then said that we do not do that anymore, which is consistent with different
jurisprudential and constitutional approaches. This philosophy is certainly
consistent with the idea of active liberty, which says, "Let's see what Congress
has to say about this subject."
48. See generally BREYER, supra note 38.
49. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); see also Philip Morris USA v.Williams, 127 S.
Ct. 1057 (2007).
50. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism &
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2006).
51. ANTONIN SCALIA & STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
DEBATE (2007).
52. See Stoneridge Invest. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
MS. BISKUPIC: I just want to mention two cases that the Court might take
which would make the docket for this Term even more exciting. In a few weeks
we will know if they will take up the Second Amendment case from the D.C.
Circuit, which will decide whether the Second Amendment is an individual right
or a right for state militias.53
The other potential case has to do with what Cher and Nicole Richie and
Bono said at various award ceremonies; the dispute is over the "fleeting
expletives" policy of the FCC. The FCC is going to file a petition in that case
by November, and we will probably know a couple months later whether they
take up that case too. 54 So we have a very rich docket to test the John Roberts
Court.
PROFESSOR AMAR: There is a lethal injection execution issue that is
going to be huge. 55  It will attract a lot of attention. The other criminal
procedure case to watch is Virginia v. Moore, where Virginia did not authorize
the police to actually arrest people for certain infractions.5 6 Nonetheless, the
police arrested individuals and conducted searches incident to those arrests. The
question is whether the evidence should be suppressed. Is it a violation of the
Fourth Amendment to ban unreasonable searches and seizures when the state
law would foreclose it?
PROFESSOR ROSEN: The partisan primary case from New York is very
interesting.57 New York elects its judges through conventions in which it is
essentially impossible to get a nomination unless you are endorsed by a
party process. One unsuccessful candidate argued that this froze her out of the
electoral system and made it impossible for the voters to have a meaningful
choice.
It is a case which may unite the great passion of our friends Justice Stevens
and Justice Kennedy in a way that might produce a majority, although there may
be others who can count these votes better. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens has
had a life-long opposition to judicial elections. He does not like partisanship or
ideas of capturing the political branches for non-neutral means, and he has been
denouncing this for years. This is a chance to say what is wrong with partisan
elections.
Justice Kennedy, as we know from the partisan primary cases, is very open
to the idea that neutrality in political competition is a First Amendment value.
53. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2008) (No. 07-290).
54. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2007) (No. 07-582).
55. Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 372 (2007) (No. 07-
5439).
56. Moore v. Virginia, 636 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 2006), cert. granted, Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct.
28 (2007) (No. 06-1082).
57. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
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In the partisan cases he resisted composing it because he could not find an
intelligible workable principle, although he said, "Come back to me if anyone
thinks of one." Well, here is the case where you can imagine striking down this
system and replacing it with merit election or another method in a way that
would be judicially acceptable.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Voter I.D. is an issue that will intersect politics
with the Court in this Term.58 We have had a lot of change in the way we
conduct federal elections since the Help America Vote Act. 59 These changes
set up concerns about and butterfly ballots on one side, and a concern about
fraud on the other. It is widely perceived that when you worry about voter
fraud, that is a euphemism for going after Democrats. Identification
requirements have been disproportionately harmful for Democrats, because they
are used mostly against poor, minority, and elderly populations, which tend to
vote in a more liberal direction.
The question in these cases is whether the Court can hold back and hope
that gerrymandering will fragment from our voter I.D. It is otherwise a
straightforward question: whether votes are diluted by restrictions that are too
draconian. For elderly people, people who remarried, or people who have name
changes, it is sometimes very difficult to get their I.D. You need to get to the
polls. Is that dilution of your vote?
PROFESSOR KMIEC: The Court may hesitate on electoral politics, but
the Court has thrown itself into the difficult area of military decision-making
in a big way. The availability, or lack thereof, of the right to constitutional
habeas corpus to the detainees in Cuba will be an issue very much fraught
with history.
The debate between Judge Randolph and Judge Rogers in the D.C. Circuit
was over the extent to which habeas corpus extended beyond the English
Kingdom, and if it did as a matter of common law, does the writ as we know
it today extend beyond our formal, territorial boundaries? At first, the
Court was inclined not to take this difficult issue, but then reversed itself.60 It
was the supposition of popular accounts that it was taken later because Justice
Stevens raised with Justice Kennedy the sufficiency of Combatant Status
Review Tribunals.
58. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S.
Ct. 33 (2007) (No. 07-21).
59. Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2002).
60. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1725 (2007),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (No. 06-1195) (reversing the Court's own prior denial for a
writ of certiorari).
There have been further developments since then, though. Suddenly the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has taken
seriously its responsibilities under the Military Commission Act.6' It has
pushed the scope of its review of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, and so
there is this other parallel track. While the writ of habeas corpus is largely
informed by history, it may also be informed by the extent to which the Court
has confidence in its lower court in Washington to provide meaningful non-
habeas review of those who are being detained.
There is also Medellin v. Texas, which is an unusual case that involves
President Bush embracing an international judgment and requiring his home
state court to apply it notwithstanding that state court's general rules that would
preclude its application under Texas criminal procedure.62 This was a case that
fascinated the Justices in oral argument. They went way past time, and they
basically had this question: "Why can the President of the United States say
what a treaty means, and impose that meaning on Texas when we thought treaty
interpretation was our job?" So one thing you can be sure of is that where the
Justices perceive that their work is being infringed on, they will come to the
forefront quite quickly.
With that prospective look at this Term's current docket, we conclude our
conversation about the riddle that is the Roberts Court. Thank you.
568
61. 10 U.S.C. §948(a) (2006).
62. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. granted, Medellin v.
Texas, 127 S. Ct. 2129 (2007) (No. 06-984).
